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Abstract: Jan Patočka’s account of responsibil-
ity, as developed in Heretical Essays in the 
Philosophy of History, is configured through the 
philosopher’s entire model of history, seen less 
as a scale of progress, but rather as a rupture. 
Responsibility is possible only for a very specific 
form of humanity, centered on history, 
problematicity and self-disclosure. This type of 
historic humanity is in profound contrast with 
the prehistoric one, focused on “daimonic par-
ticipation.” Responsibility involves the passage 
from prehistory to history. Despite the fact that 
it requires an intense “discipline of the soul,” 
the passage to responsibility cannot become 
pure and transparent, which in turn means that 
history is repeatedly threatened by falling back 
into prehistory. The positive involved in this 
assumption is that responsibility is not taken for 
granted; it is not a matter of following meta-
physical principles, but rather a matter of a 
practical, “heretical” decision of embracing 
history, with its shaken problematicity, and of 
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Resumen: La comprensión de Jan Patočka de 
la responsabilidad, tal como se desarrolladen 
Ensayos eréticos de filosofía de la Historia, 
viene configurada por el modelo completo de 
Historia, vista más como una ruptura que como 
una escala de progreso. La responsabilidad es 
posible sólo para una forma muy concreta de 
humanidad, centrada en la historia, la proble-
maticidad y el autodescubrimiento. Este tipo de 
humanidad histórica se halla en profundo con-
traste con el tipo prehistórico, focalizado sobre 
la “participación demónica”. La responsabilidad 
implica el tránsito de la prehistoria a la historia. 
Pese a requerir una intensa “disciplina del al-
ma”, el tránsito a la responsabilidad no puede 
tornarse puro y transparente, lo que a su vez 
significa que la historia está constantemente 
amenzada por una recaída en la prehistoria. El 
lado positivo que esta asunción envuelve es que 
la responsabilidad no se da por garantizada; no 
es una cuestión de seguir principios metafísicos, 
sino más bien cuestión de una decisión práctica, 
“herética”, de abrazar la historia, con su pro-
blematicidad conmovida, y de resistir la tenta-
ción de la prehistoria.  
 
 
Palabras clave: Filosofía de la historia, feno-





One of the distinguishing features of a philosophical career is to be touched 
by a moment of pessimism, by the acknowledgment that the entire mold in 
332 LAURA TUSA ILEA 
 
 332 Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/I (2013): Razón y Vida. 
 
which it articulates “reality” is fragile, and enables only a restricted perspective 
on a situation that remains intangible in its entirety. Despite continuous efforts 
to formulate the “principle of reality”, philosopher’s life is confronted with mo-
ments when the complex game of history seems to exceed his understanding, 
as well as his capacity to judge.  
Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History by Jan Patočka1 seems to be 
such a moment of pessimism, but at the same time it also represents the hum-
ble and uncompromising hope that the humanity of homo humanus is more 
resistant to the apparently innumerable dead ends posed by contemporary 
technologic era. It starts from the presupposition—present also in different oth-
er texts written by the Czech philosopher—that the twentieth century and the 
beginning of the twenty-first century have exhausted the most audacious nihil-
istic possibilities2.  
As a first step in my analysis, I will raise the following question: Whom 
should we blame for the disasters that shaped the twentieth century? Meta-
physics with its constant aspirations that lead to sacrifices in the name of a 
transcendental idea? Or should we simply say that European history was a long 
odyssey of cruelty, especially when it started the saga of an increasing expand-
ing power, as of the sixteenth century?  
The consequence of such assumptions would be that there is no transcen-
dental order that could impose its strategies. Moreover, since humanistic dog-
mas seem to become obsolete, there would be no underlying human virtues 
that could impose a higher responsibility or different behavior dogmas. Conse-
quently, the notion of responsibility becomes problematic: in the name of what 
principle could we proclaim human rights, responsibility to the others and to the 
world, to environment and to the generations to come? What are the notions 
involved in discussing self-responsibility and how can we restore their meaning?  
These are questions I will answer in this article, by focusing on Patočka’s 
model of history as a specific type of human quest. It is shaped by a precise 
moment that originated in early Greek times, when the debate with death was 
 
 
1 Jan Patočka, Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, transl. Erazim Kohák, (Chicago and La Salle, 
Illinois: Open Court, 1996). 
2 Jan Patočka, “L’homme spirituel et l’intellectuel” in Liberté et sacrifice, transl. Erika Abrams (Grenoble: 
Jerôme Millon, 1993), 254, describes three forms of nihilism as follows: the joyful, creative nihilism; the 
nihilism that surrendered to an objective power; and the perplex nihilism, suffering from a form of inter-
nal paralysis. 
HERETICAL DIMENSIONS OF SELF RESPONSABILITY BY JAN PATOČKA 333 
 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/I (2013): Razón y Vida. 333 
 
confronted directly, instead of being approached through ancient wisdom, 
myths, and consolation rites. This inaugural moment occurred during the time 
of Socrates, who validated a philosophic dogma by his courage of defying 
death—and eventually through his own death. This was the moment when phil-
osophical arguments regarding fundamental notions such as a life worth living, 
beauty, justice, immortality, rules and state were debated in agora. For 
Patočka, Greek polis embodies the simultaneous birth of philosophy, of politics 
and of history; it represents the most eloquent incarnation of the passage from 
prehistory to history, the moment when humans were finally placed at the core 
of the Greek worldview, with all disadvantages involved.   
Even if Patočka’s account of “the birth of history” on the model of the Greek 
polis may seem naïve, there is an important aspect that we should still consid-
er: the Czech philosopher places problematicity at the very core of history. 
Problematicity is the condition sine qua non of a form of humanity that strongly 
embraces history—a humanity that considers life in freedom as superior to 
mere life.  
Being the main attribute of the “historic condition” problematicity repre-
sents at the same time the intrinsic initiator of countless quests that eventually 
resulted in different forms of hybris—science, technology, exploration of outer 
worlds, psychoanalysis, bioscience. In other words, the multifarious perspec-
tives that Patočka ascribes to the twentieth century are already grounded in the 
very dawn of Western civilization; they originate in the inception of its history, 
through a specific determinant: problematicity. 
Further on, I will investigate Patočka’s understanding of the passage from 
prehistory to history, as well as his view on the reasons why other important 
civilizations would not have embraced this specific type of “historical” quest. 
 
 
1.  PREHISTORY-HISTORY 
 
When reviewing Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, Aviezer Tuck-
er accused Jan Patočka of inconsistencies, attributed to the philosopher’s bit-
terness of living the end of his life under a merciless Communist regime. The 
author claims that, “after the reasonable start” of tracing back history’s begin-
ning to the simultaneous birth of the Greek polis, of philosophy and of politics, 
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Patočka reached some unbelievable, at best naïve, and at worst proto-Fascist, con-
clusions about history that are inconsistent with his interpretation of the polis and 
the ethical system of the founder of the Charter 77 movement of human rights in 
Czechoslovakia.3 
 
A second claim made by Aviezer Tucker against Patočka concerns his ar-
gument that Hellenic and Roman Empires had fallen because “they failed to 
convince their citizens that they were just”. According to him, Patočka present-
ed the fall of the polis, the Hellenic world and the Roman Empire, “as a public 
relations problem”. The Czech philosopher would have claimed that the Europe-
an Middle Ages represented the zenith of European history, focused on “care for 
the soul”, truth, justice, and authenticity. Tucker’s boldest affirmation is that 
“Patočka regarded war as the greatest enterprise of technological civilization, 
total mobilization”4. 
There are many occurrences in Patočka’s Heretical Essays in the Philosophy 
of History that work against this kind of affirmations. I believe that Tucker is 
misled by Patočka’s dealing with “ambiguous” notions such as war, phenome-
nology of darkness, and conversion, implied by the passage from “orgiastic” to 
responsibility. My intention is to further clarify these notions, in order to explain 
the Czech philosopher’s ideas about history, as well as his concept of responsi-
bility. 
Patočka’s demonstrations assume indeed that European history is mobilized 
around the concepts of the soul, of justice and of authenticity. Generally speak-
ing, he refers to a very specific historical type of humanity centered on 
problematicity, on finitude as problem, on a “disintegrated conscience”. History 
as such is incompatible with the prehistoric era, precisely because it represents 
a different type of approach, based on the full conscience of death instead of 
rituals, on the acceptation of a problematic condition and on the attempt to find 
a trace of everlastingness through political action, philosophy, and poetry, in-
stead of transferring the weight of decision to gods—the only immortal beings 
in an universe prone to decay. History does not overlap with the entire trajecto-
ry of the humanity. It is a rupture, a differentiation.  
 
 
3 Aviezer Tucker, “Reviewed work: Essais Hérétiques sur la Philosophie de L'Histoire by Jan Patočka” in 
History and Theory, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Middletown, Connecticut: Blackwell Publishing for Wesleyan Universi-
ty, Oct. 1992), 356. 
4 Ibid., 358. 
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My argument is based precisely on this distinction: Patočka does not identi-
fy the beginning of history with the first written proof of human civilized life, 
but with the very moment when the conscience of problematicity arises, when 
life becomes unsheltered. Whereas prehistorical life is characterized by “ac-
ceptance, transmission, preservation, securing of life”5, recorded in annals, the 
historical phase involves an unsheltered life led “in active tension, one of ex-
treme risk and upward striving”6.  
What is disquieting about this statement is that Patočka considers even so-
phisticated civilizations such as the Near East, Egypt and ancient China as 
prehistorical, “great households” aiming at the simple “preservation of the life-
style of prehistorical humanity” (28). He does not intend to downgrade this 
type of civilizations by rejecting them to a phase that completely lacks com-
plexity. His argument refers instead to the fact that prehistory and history are 
differently articulated as a whole. Their worldviews are not compatible. Where-
as prehistoric civilizations are in full harmony with the surrounding world, the 
distinctive feature of a problematic, historic society is its detachment from na-
ture and from simplicity. On the other hand, Patočka fears that contemporary 
humanity may no longer be willing to embrace history with all its array of in-
conveniences. On the contrary, it rather wants to adopt a more serene form of 
life, strongly connected with the surrounding world. This would not mean reces-
sion, but a shift in the way humanity conceives itself. 
Moreover, in order to understand what Patočka has in mind when he al-
ludes to the abyss opened between prehistoric and historic civilizations, we 
should mention that he conceives existence as determined by three move-
ments: acceptance, defense, truth7. These three movements are paralleled with 
the Aristotelian three souls (vegetative, animate and rational), as well as with 
Hannah Arendt’s three movements of life: labor, work and action. From all 
three, only the last one is fully incarnating the historic “human condition,” with 
its highs and lows, with its greatness as well as with its risks. 
 
 
5 Patočka, Heretical Essays, 28. 
6 Ibid., 36. 
7 See Patočka, Heretical Essays, 28-40, as well as “The ‘Natural’ World and Phenomenology,” in Erazim 
Kohák, Jan Patočka: Philosophy and Selected Writings (Chicago&London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1989), 239-273, “Care and the Three Movements of Human Life,” and “The Three Movements of 
Human Life,” in Jan Patočka, Body, Community, Language, World (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open 
Court, 1998), 143-153 and 153-163. 
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Acceptance is characterized in Patočka’s view by mechanical adaptation, by 
the submission to the ever-recurring rhythm of nature. This is the main feature 
of animal laborans. Defense is characterized by a rhythmical alternation of bur-
den and relief, of oppression and alleviation. It consists in an exchange be-
tween acceptance and ecstasy. Ecstasy is described as the “increasingly intense 
abandon that lets us touch upon the realm of the undifferentiated in ecstasy 
and participate in it as in the bliss of being”8. 
The quest for truth implies a distance and a reaction. But against what? 
What differentiates the quest for truth, the care for the soul and ideals of au-
thenticity and justice, made possible by the historic paradigm, from the abso-
lute order of the purely natural rhythm of “divine households,” characterized by 
a cosmo-ontological metaphor without barrier between the human society and 
the universe?9. 
This cosmo-ontological metaphor involves the idea that there is no differ-
ence between what is and ‘being,’ between phenomena and their manifestation. 
Both dimensions converge on a single plan. Experience and symbolic metaphor 
belong to a similar level of reality as the everyday burden and the honoring of 
the ancestors. Life and death succeed each other in an unfathomable, unques-
tioned rhythm. “Humans before history do not differentiate between the night 
as fact of experience and night as darkness out of which the lightning of being 
strikes”10. For them, “Being shares with beings the same region of one and the 
same world in which everything is simultaneously manifested and concealed” 
(35). 
On the contrary, history constitutes a rupture. Patočka characterizes history 
as “a distancing from and a reaction against the period of prehistory”, “a rising 
above the level of the prehistorical, an attempt at a renewal and resurgence of 
life” (36). In other words, history could be equated with a propaedeutic for a 




8 Patočka, Heretical Essays, 32. 
9 Ibid., p. 35: “The will to permanence is essentially sacral and ritualistic, having to do with a fundamen-
tal characteristic of prehistoric truth—the cosmic-ontological metaphor.” 
10 Ibid., 32. 
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2. RESPONSIBILITY AND HISTORY 
 
In Patočka’s view, one cannot talk about responsibility without fully assum-
ing the historic condition. However, when analyzing Patočka’s notion of respon-
sibility, Jacques Derrida shifts the discussion towards the religious context, by 
clearly distinguishing between daimonic participation—in which the self accom-
plishes its role only as part of community—and the religion of responsibility—
which involves the genealogy of a free subject. Derrida’s thesis concerning Jan 
Patočka’s Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History underlines that “one can 
speak of religion once the demonic secret, and the orgiastic sacred, have been 
surpassed”11. 
In Derrida’s view, there are two different types of religion. Firstly, the de-
monic, “orgiastic” type of religion, which emphasizes participation, by putting 
forward notions in which the whole community believes. Secondly, the religion 
of responsibility involves a different configuration of the self, focused on an ap-
parently “absurd” decision, as in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, on a “here-
tic” dislodging that overcomes ancestor’s knowledge and the participatory 
forms of truth. 
The concept of daimon is used by Jan Patočka when referring to the multi-
layered dimension of the self. The self would be easily understood if it were on-
ly a rational part of a greater responsibility project, if it would not involve any 
kind of boundary-crossing. But daimon constitutes the original metaphor of the 
self—being inherently connected to and at the same time radically distanced 
from us. Daimon is invisible to us and visible to the others. Truth about the self 
is translated in prehistorical times through daimonic power, pertaining to oth-
ers. We do not have complete access to our truth because we are not confront-
ed with the decision of responsibility. This is the reason why in prehistoric times 
our self belongs to the others, as revelatory daimon. 
Daimon is invisible for two reasons: firstly, because it configures a space of 
irresponsibility, a space of crossing borders between the human, the animal and 
the divine. It shares many affinities with what Patočka calls “undifferentiated 
night”, where “one does not yet hear the call to explain oneself, one’s actions, 
one’s thoughts, to respond to the other and answer for oneself before the oth-
 
 
11 Jacques Derrida, “Secrets of European Responsibility”, in The Gift of Death & Literature in Secret, 
transl. David Wills (Chicago&London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 4. 
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er”12. Secondly, in prehistoric times one’s actions cannot configure completely a 
personality without gaining power from the community. I am not fully a master 
of myself and of my acts. The way I appear to others diverges in most cases 
from my personal image—from how I intend to act and to react. Daimonic par-
ticipation seems to be separated by a profound gap from the responsibility pro-
ject, characterizing the historic communities. 
Under these conditions, how can the orgiastic participation of prehistoric 
civilizations accomplish the passage towards a project of responsibility? Moreo-
ver, how can such a project become institutionalized, when, according to the 
main Christian dogmatic thesis, responsibility is a matter of facing mysterium 
tremendum? 
Derrida advances two theses concerning the project of responsibility: first 
of all, he points out that in the tripartite European project analyzed by Jan 
Patočka (Greek polis, Roman Empire, Christian religion), the Czech philosopher 
emphasizes the latter. Secondly, in his view, Patočka’s description of Europe 
attempts to modify the European project by underlining the exceeding respon-
sibility of the mysterium tremendum. Facing such an overwhelming dialectical 
counterpart—the transcendence of the Other—, responsibility remains in itself a 
secret. Compared to the prehistoric secrecy, based on the incomprehensible 
power of the divine, the secret of responsibility relies on a configuration of the 
self stemming from practical decisions, which defy knowledge and norms and 
which are heretic to a certain degree. The self is shaped through these face-to-
face processes (for example Socrates’ trial of death, Abraham’s trial of faith, 
Kierkegaard’s repetition, Patočka’s problematic historic condition). In Derrida’s 
view (and this is his second argument): 
 
Religion exists once the secret of the sacred, orgiastic, or demonic mystery has 
been integrated, subjected to the sphere of responsibility… Religion (history) is re-
sponsibility or it is nothing at all. Its history derives its sense entirely from the idea 
of a passage to responsibility. 13 
 
This passage to responsibility is primarily an individual act (see Abraham’s 
conversion in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling). Originally, it is not altogether 
 
 
12 Ibid., 5. 
13 Ibid. 
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a rational act, a matter of knowledge of the good as it was in Platonism. In or-
der to accomplish the passage from an individual to a collective responsibility, 
there is the need of a coherent rational project. This passage is a matter of in-
dividual “unworldly conversions”, —like love and the encountering of death—
which become collective “worldly occurrences”—for instance respect, civil 
rights, and religious regulations. The bridge between the individual act and the 
collective responsibility implies a rational transformation. At the core of the re-
sponsibility project, there is an individual “secret”, a personal decision to obey 
something that one does not fully encompass. The passage to rationality goes 
through an exceeding experience of assuming the responsibility. 
Even if Patočka refers frequently to politics, philosophy and history by ana-
lyzing the notion of responsibility, Derrida insists on the fact that “the history of 
responsibility is tied to the history of religion” and that there is no other way 
out of this. Even though today responsibility may be founded on civil rights, on 
a specific type of humanistic understanding, in Derrida’s view, the propaedeutic 
passes through a religious conversion, and especially through absolute deci-
sions that involve departing from knowledge or given norms. 
In my opinion, when discussing Patočka’s role of conversion, Derrida insists 
too much on the religious aspect. I would rather emphasize the phenomenolog-
ical concept of everydayness that is “converted” through the decision of re-
sponsibility. In order to understand Patočka’s account of historic responsibility, 
we should consequently focus on the phenomenological background of the con-
cept of everydayness. In Patočka’s view, everydayness has not only the neutral 
Heideggerian accents; it is not only a pure phenomenological description of the 
most elementary traits of a being-in-the-world, but it belongs to a level of ex-
perience that remains fully absorbed in the process of life preservation, life 
multiplication, securing of the private household. As a reaction to the pressure 
exercised by daily life conditions, the human being has always tried to escape 
the circle of everydayness, either through daimonic forms of participation or 
through ethical decisions that traced the path towards responsibility. All human 
achievements are indebted to an attempt to overcome everydayness, mere life, 
life preservation. 
In other words, Patočka’s conception regarding the passage from prehistory 
to history is based on two ways of overcoming the problems of everydayness. 
a) The first one is achieved through the secrecy of the orgiastic, the sacred as 
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enthusiasm or fervor for fusion—Eleusis mysteries, for example. b) The second 
path is achieved through responsibility. It is a completely different approach 
than the first one because it engages a genealogy of the self that is no longer a 
matter of acceptance of rules, rituals and worldviews; it is no longer an immer-
sion into a sheltered form of life. The self is shaped through an unsheltered 
form of confronting death, by assuming a problematic condition rendered by 
the fact that man acknowledges his finitude and his capacity to convey an an-
swer to it.  
Moreover, the genealogy of responsibility involves a relationship to death, 
based not on its integration into a perennial rhythm of ever-recurring birth and 
rebirth, but on dramatical confrontation with death.  The gift of death is the 
main accomplishment of the conversion from orgiastic secrecy to responsibility. 
“A history of secrecy as history of responsibility is tied to a culture of death” 
(12). 
The term “culture of death” may seem misleading. It is not necessarily tied 
to Christian religion. Patočka places its first roots in Socrates’ trial of death, 
which proved, this time in a philosophical way, Socrates’ belief in the immortali-
ty of the soul. But it is also constituted by contemporary attempts toward a 
“hermeneutics of facticity”, of everydayness: Martin Heidegger (Being and 
Time)14, Paul Ricœur (Fallible Man)15, Hans Jonas (The Imperative of Responsi-
bility)16; they all have in common the assumption of finitude, of frailty and of 
the human mortal condition. 
Being an intense discipline connected to a culture of death, this project of 
responsibility represents at the same time the achievement of a dimension be-
yond death, immortality. It constitutes the birth of a new conscience that is for 
the first time able to look death in the face, and through this process, con-
science attains a new freedom. The orgiastic becomes responsibility through an 
intense discipline of the soul as an attentive anticipation of death. This anticipa-
tion —called by most philosophers care, concern, or solicitude— manifests as a 
sort of thaumaturgy, an art healing for a life threatened by decadence.  
 
 
14 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, transl. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: SCM 
Press, 1962); re-translated by Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996). 
15 Paul Ricœur, Fallible Man, transl. Charles A. Kelbley, with an introduction by Walter J. Lowe, (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 1986). 
16 Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of Ethics for the Technological Age (transl. of 
Das Prinzip Verantwortung) trans. Hans Jonas and David Herr (1979). (University of Chicago Press, 
1984). 
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We should keep in mind that, in Patočka’s view, such history implies under-
standing the secret relations between three mysteries—orgiastic, Platonic, 
Christian—and two conversions—orgiastic-Platonic, Platonic-Christian. We could 
say that responsibility means inserting oneself into a history that becomes ripe 
for its project, but on the other hand, it also implies a practical decision, break-
ing with given norms. The genealogy of responsibility is connected to heresy—
in the sense of a practical decision that goes beyond any theoretical back-
ground determination. It overlaps with the genealogy of the self; in this con-
frontation between certainty and uncertainty, the risk involved is precisely what 
gives shape to the self.  
To summarize, Derrida’s interpretation of Patočka tackles responsibility as 
tied to three different factors: first of all, to practical decisions that involve 
breaking with knowledge or given norms; to faith, which manifests as a “ven-
ture into absolute risk, beyond knowledge and certainty”; and finally, it is con-
nected to the gift of death, in its relation with the transcendence of the other. 
 
 
3. POLEMOS AS A WAY OF RESTORING MEANING 
 
The passage from prehistory to history, in other words from orgiastic to re-
sponsibility, involves an important additional feature, which is maybe the most 
obscure notion in Patočka’s philosophy of history: namely polemos, understood 
as triumph over death. Responsibility is subject to a perpetual struggle because 
it implies that one is placed at the limit of human possibilities, facing deca-
dence, death, and nihilism. There is no responsibility when there is no threat of 
falling back into the inhuman—into “undifferentiated night”. 
This disquieting premise, for which he was accused of being reactionary, 
stands at the heart of Patočka’s thought. Paul Ricœur considers his essay “Wars 
of the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War” to be a “strange, 
frankly shocking” essay, involving “a paradoxical phenomenology of dark-
ness”17, a fragile contract between night and day. 
In this context, Patočka’s discourse seems misleading. However, it can be 
traced back to Heraclitus’ theory of unity of opposites. Patočka’s argumentation 
could be misleading because it talks about “war as a further experience of the 
 
 
17 Paul Ricœur, “Preface to the French Edition of Jan Patočka’s Heretical Essays”, in Heretical Essays, viii. 
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gift of death”18, as if he praised war as a modality to restore meaning. As if, 
without facing the concrete danger of a life-destroying situation, meaning no 
longer survived, veiled by either the exceeding indifference of consumerism or 
by the non-reflexive overpowering of technology. In other words, restoring 
meaning would be mostly possible under paradoxical, threatening conditions. 
Under these circumstances, war seems to be the most authentic escape when 
trying to overcome the inauthenticity of everydayness. But Patočka affirms that 
it manifests nothing else than a violent discharge of the orgiastic, which in pre-
historic times signified the sacred instinct. In this ambiguity posed by war re-
sides its malevolent and attractive power. Undoubtedly, through facing limit 
situations, through its encountering of death as a “common” event, war has 
nothing to do with the placidity and the banality of everydayness. In times de-
void of any discipline of the soul, there are not many means available for over-
coming the profound boredom of everydayness.  
The message I want to convey through this text is that, in Patočka’s view, 
war seems to be the solution for a form of humanity that in principle has not 
yet overcome a prehistoric type of participation, despite the fact that it lives 
under historic conditions. In other words, it has not yet accomplished the pas-
sage from prehistory to history.  
If in prehistoric times the sacred is directly connected to orgiastic rituals—
that sometimes lead to temporary destitution of the secular order—, in historic 
times this “sacred model” is replaced by the responsibility project, which in-
volves in its turn (see above page 14) the tripartite dimension of “heretical” 
decisions—breaking with knowledge or given norms, faith and the gift of death. 
Tucker’s analyses seem correct in this respect. I will quote him extensively, 
because I think that his debate highlights the illusion that life-threatening situa-
tions unveil an authentic part of being. 
 
The experience of self-sacrifice in war certainly liberates those who experience it 
from the concerns of everyday, from the mediocrity of production and reproduction. 
But this liberation is not necessarily an improvement on mediocrity; sometimes, 
and perhaps most of the time, it begets a deterioration, a dehumanization… Most 
veterans, from Sulla’s to contemporary Vietnam vets, or Russian veterans of the 
Afghanistan war, or Israeli veterans of the Lebanon war, do not gain much from 
 
 
18 Derrida, The Gift of Death, 19. 
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losing the ordered life of production, consumption, and reproduction, because they 
have within them nothing to guide them out of the apocalypse. Jaspers was wrong 
in thinking that life-threatening situations alter people. It seems more plausible that 
such situations bring out personality traits that are usually hidden below the sur-
face. War brings out the sadists and the saints, the dehumanizing and the human, 
but mostly in the life of ordinary people it begets confusion.19  
 
His conclusion envisions the saga of consumerism as opposed to ideals of 
transcendence, which permeate European civilization. Consumerism is under-
stood as absolving the human quest from the need to find a dimension “beyond 
the self”. It is also conceived as “suburbanization”, focused only on suburban 
dreams, renouncing any false transcendence, as if it were the scapegoat for a 
whole history of human violence and cruelty. 
However, in my opinion, “suburban dreams”, immersed in a complete lack 
of transcendence, succumb to a disease sometimes even more disquieting than 
the transcendental quest: the odyssey of profound boredom. Boredom repre-
sents under these circumstances less a mood20, but rather the ontological con-




4. CAN THE RESPONSIBILITY PROJECT BECOME PURE AND TRANSPARENT? 
 
Boredom as an ontological condition is not harmless. The twentieth century 
is the proof that the “demonic peak” (Patočka), as a consequence of boredom 
and relativism of all values, can go hand in hand with the greatest sobriety and 
rationality. In Patočka’s view, at the end of the historic saga, humanity seems 
to return to where it began: to the rejection of everything that can problema-
tize the everydayness, the here and now. Under these conditions, every form of 
overcoming the everydayness is seen in its potential fallacy, as it was proven 
by the turbulent development of history. The difference from the inception of 
history lies in the fact that, instead of pure subsistence, boredom creates its 
own substitutes of transcendence, its own disguises of meaning.  
 
 
19 Tucker, “Reviewed work: Essais Hérétiques sur la Philosophie de L'Histoire by Jan Patočka”, 361. 
20 See also in this respect Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World, Finitude, 
Solitude, transl. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1995), 78-169. 
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Maybe human beings cannot live basked in relative meaning. Relative 
meaning could be only an illusory substitute to transcendence, threatened by a 
continuous ‘falling back’ into the orgiastic—understood as a way to elude the 
responsibility project. Instead of a self-configuration that occurs as a triumph 
over death, the orgiastic re-emerges in the form of a participatory sacredness. 
The decline into the orgiastic is always possible because, by lacking the com-
plex configuration of the responsibility frame— practical decisions, polemos as 
triumph over death, hairesis as courageous assuming of a problematic condi-
tion—, the only way to overcome the “banality” of everydayness remains a col-
lective outburst of energy. Patočka gives several examples of this return of the 
orgiastic, by saying that every revolution contains elements of the sacred, in 
the forms of the Fatherland, of Liberty and of Reason. The rejection of the 
complex constellation in which the responsibility project was born leads to al-
ienating 
 
humans from themselves, depriving them of dwelling in the world, submerging 
them in the everyday alternative which is not so much toil as boredom, or in cheap 
substitutes and ultimately in orgiastic brutality.21 
 
In summary: on the one hand, every dramatic change in history is threat-
ened by falling back into the orgiasticthe return of the sacred, of prehistory. 
On the other hand, in order for the orgiastic to become a philosophical-political 
program, it needs to be fully integrated in the new project of freedom and re-
sponsibility based on the structure of a well-configured self. The best scenario 
would be that the orgiastic be entirely forgotten. Yet, its temptation cannot be 
fully removed; it can be only disciplined and made subservient. In other words, 
the prehistoric configuration emerges in the most fragile moments of history, 
namely when revolutions, wars and abrupt changes occur. According to 
Patočka, it is very likely that the responsibility project could not become pure 
and transparent. This conclusion has obvious Nietzschean accents. 
Whereas in the Heideggerian equation authenticity–care, the element of a 
tamed daimon (war, violence, devastation) does not appear, in Patočka’s ar-
gument it is fully developed. Consequently, according to Derrida, Patočka’s ge-
nealogy is more Nietzschean than Husserlian and Heideggerian. The 
 
 
21 Patočka, Heretical Essays, 117. 
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Heideggerian existential analysis becomes obsolete in Patočka’s program if the 
project of self-responsibility cannot become pure and transparent. The political 
lesson involved in such conclusion confirms that “every thought revolution 
bears witness to a return of the sacred in the form of enthusiasm or fervor 
(presence of the gods within us, nadir of devastation)”22. 
Derrida’s conclusion regarding Patočka’s diagnosis on the genealogy of re-
sponsibility refers once again to its heretical character: responsibility is on the 
one hand subject to the objectivity of knowledge. But on the other hand it is 
also subject to a practical decision that goes beyond any theoretical or thematic 
determination. As a consequence, it is tied to heresy, hairesis as decision, 
choice, inclination.  
 
 
5. THE RELEVANCE OF PATOČKA’S DIAGNOSIS FOR THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 
 
In our case, as witnesses to a “post-European” civilization23, the decision of 
responsibility reveals a dilemma: it is not only a matter of whether there are 
absolute or liberal principles in the name of which responsibility could be justi-
fied (reason, nature, God), but whether contemporary humanity is still willing 
to embrace history as such. Patočka’s answer is very clear in this respect. He is 
concerned that humankind is no longer willing to embrace history with its in-
trinsic tension and its shaken problematic.  
According to him, the situation seems to have no escape:  
 
Modern civilization suffers not only from its own flows and myopia but also from the 
failure to resolve the entire problem of history. Yet the problem of history may not 
be resolved, it must be preserved as a problem. Today the danger is that knowing 





22 Derrida, The Gift of Death, 23. 
23 According to Patočka, the European project was entirely dissolute following the “two suicides” of the 
twentieth century: the two World Wars. There are also other voices that consider the “post-European” 
era to be a consequence of the “crisis” already announced by Husserl at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. See in this respect: E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy 
(1936/54), transl. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), Jan Patočka, L’Europe 
après l’Europe, transl. Erika Abrams, (Verdier: Lagrasse, 2007), Jacques Derrida, L’autre Cap (Paris: Les 
Editions de Minuit, 1991), Marc Crépon, Altérités de l’Europe, (Paris: Galilée, 2006). 
24 Patočka, Heretical Essays, 118. 
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The concept of history as insolvable means that we should remain “at the 
limit of human possibilities” by acknowledging that the responsibility project 
cannot be given once and for all. It continually threatens to fall back into the 
inauthentic, the violent and the orgiastic return of the sacred. Self-sacrifice is 
not enough to enable the restoration of authentic human nature. On the contra-
ry, without consistent practice and self-discipline, self-sacrifice can lead to con-
fusion and violent ideologies.  
In order to follow a possible path towards the restoration of the integral 
humanity, those willing to undertake it must be prepared: self-sacrifice means 
for Patočka “the overcoming of the technical understanding of being”25. Under 
general conditions, sacrifice means obligation: we sacrifice something inferior, 
in order to gain something superior. Patočka insists on a Christian paradigm, 
which does not place the divine force under any obligation. Christianity frames 
the divine precisely as rooted in the radicalism of the sacrifice. 
The force of sacrifice confers power and understanding to our inner rela-
tionship to truth. It is capable of reshaping the content of the world we live in. 
While Patočka banks on this force of transformation, he is on the other hand 
aware of the fact that it is kept in a very fragile balance: the orgiastic returns in 
hidden and distorted forms in the midst of the responsibility project, precisely 
because history is not a frozen concept, a stage on the scale of progress. On 
the contrary, history shapes a problematic configuration of humankind, based 
on polemos, on courageous defying of death, on assuming responsibility. All 
these dimensions seem to be of no worth in difficult times. Thus the temptation 
of returning to non-responsibility, to non-ethics, to pervasive voices of hidden 
sacredness. The sacrifice of maintaining oneself at the 
 
dark limits of human possibilities is the characteristic experience of our time and of 
the time just passed, an experience which might lead to a transformation of the 
way we understand both life and the world—a transformation capable of bringing 
our outwarldly rich yet essentially impoverished age to face itself, free of romantic 




25 Jan Patočka, “The Dangers of Technicization in Science according to E. Husserl and the Essence of 
Technology as Danger according to M. Heidegger,” in Erazim Kohák, Jan Patočka: Philosophy and Select-
ed Writings (Chicago&London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 337. 
26 Ibid., 339. 
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As a consequence, when Patočka addresses the notions of darkness and 
night, contrary to what Tucker believes, he discusses on the one hand the dan-
ger of falling back into the “undifferentiated night”; on the other hand he ad-
mits that “darkness” is not only a stage in the development of mankind, to be 
overcome in the name of peace. On the contrary, the philosophy of history 
should take into account war at its very heart; and peace only as an exception, 
as an island of unexpected balance.  
Contrary to these apparently “orphic” sentences, Patočka’s investigations 
do not lead to a prescription of metaphysical dogmas. In his view, metaphysics 
is only one of the projects through which historical humanity has embodied its 
quest for truth. The Czech philosopher does not suggest a return to a meta-
physics that contains underlying dogmatic certainties. What he proposes is a 
non-dogmatic openness towards a form of transcendence that involves respon-
sibility as “solidarity of the shaken but undaunted”. His solution also evokes 
what he calls problematicity: an attitude which takes into account negative ex-
periences and formulates inquiries into what generally seems obvious. Respon-
sibility thus understood creates authentic social institutions, authentic “public 
relations” and a kind of philosophy that is not only repeating general metaphys-





As argued by Jan Patočka in Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, 
there are two distinct types of humanity: the prehistoric one, centered on the 
dimension of the “orgiastic”; and the historic type of humanity, based on re-
sponsibility.  
In order to answer the questions—how can the orgiastic participation of 
prehistoric civilizations accomplish the passage towards a project of responsibil-
ity and how can such a project be institutionalized—I have focused on the the-
sis that, based on Patočka’s account of history, responsibility embodies the pro-
ject of a specific form of humanity, centered on history, problematicity and dis-
closure of the self. The “orgiastic” becomes responsibility through an intense 
discipline of the soul, as an attentive anticipation of death—anticipation that 
manifests as a sort of thaumaturgy. 
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 Moreover, despite this intense discipline of the soul, the passage from “or-
giastic” to responsibility can never be fully accomplished. In Jan Patočka’s view, 
the temptation of the “orgiastic,”—of the prehistoric—occurs in the most fragile 
moments of history, namely when an unquestioned sacredness tends to replace 
the decision of responsibility. This is the reason why the responsibility project 
cannot become pure and transparent. 
The decline into the orgiastic threatens continuously because, by lacking 
the complex configuration of the responsibility frame, the only way to escape 
the circle of everydayness seems to be by means of a collective outburst of en-
ergy. The return of “prehistory” in the midst of the responsibility project is ex-
plained by the problematic configuration of history—based on polemos, deci-
sion, responsibility—that seem to be of no worth in difficult times. Thus the 
temptation of returning to non-responsibility, to non-ethics, to daimonic partici-
pation.  
The threat to fall back into the inauthentic, the violent and the orgiastic re-
turn of the sacred makes responsibility not only a matter of following meta-
physical principles and given norms, but also a matter of practical conversion, 
of an ever repeated decision to resist the apparently powerful outbursts of en-
ergy that testify for a return of a violent sacredness. Responsibility means will-
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